Game Theory: A Modeling Approach

This is an introductory game theory book that quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of game theory to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts. The book is linear, as the chapters are not independent. Readers should be able to build simple game theoretic models after chapter 3. Each subsequent chapter adds another feature to the reader's model-building repertoire.

Author Biography: Richard Alan Gillman is a mathematics professor at Valparaiso University. David Housman teaches courses in applied mathematics and computer science at Goshen College.

Models and Games INTRODUCTION TO MODELING INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY EXAMPLES OF GAMES RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION Player Preferences ORDINAL UTILITIES VON NEUMANNMORGENSTERN UTILITIES CONSTRUCTING UTILITIES DETERMINING RISK Simultaneous Play STRATEGIC GAMES FINAL JEOPARDY MIXED STRATEGIES NONMATRIX MODELS LIMITATIONS Bilateral Agreements NEGOTIATIONS BARGAINING IN STRATEGIC GAMES FAIRNESS PROPERTIES Sequential Play SEQUENTIAL GAMES SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA COMBINATORIAL GAMES MORAL HAZARD Missing Information IMPERFECT INFORMATION ROMANS AND GERMANS INCOMPLETE INFORMATION BARGAINING GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AUCTIONS Repetitious Play REPEATED SOCIAL DILEMMAS MODELING NOISE EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY Multilateral Agreements SHAPLEY ARGUMENT NUCLEOLUS ARGUMENT BARGAINING ARGUMENT VOTING POWER Resource Allocation RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM BARGAINING AND COALITION MODELS COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODELS CONCLUDING REMARKS