The Economics of Oligopolistic Competition

Professor Kuenne is a leading authority in the field of economic theory, having made significant contributions to the fields of general equilibrium theory, industrial organization and regional science.
This volume focuses on the development and exposition of a new theory of oligopoly which is asserted to have certain advantages over game theoretic approaches. It is designed to be opertional, to be capable of fitting within general equilibrium frameworks, to permit multiobjective optimization by firms, and to be soluble by nonlinear programming techniques.
Most importantly, Professor Kuenne develops themes concerning the need to incorporate within oligopoly a blending of the cooperative and competitive that typifies the price strategies of oligopolists within most industries with small numbers of competitors. Unlike game theory, this approach permits analysis of the peculiar socioeconomic power structure that develops within oligopolies and constrains members′ decision–making freedom. This power structure can be derived exogenously or endogenously in the modelling. The theory is developed fully with extensive empirical application, particularly to decision making within the OPEC petroleum cartel in the 1970s.

Nota biograficzna:
Robert E Kuenne is Professor of Economics and Director of the General Economic Systems Project at Princeton University. He holds a PhD degree from Harvard and has taught at Harvard University and the University of Virginia. He was a Visiting Professor at the US Army War College for 18 years, and has been a Ford Foundation Faculty Fellow, Rochefeller Foundation Research Fellow, National Institues of Health Fellow and is currently a Fulbright Research Fellow at the University of Vienna. He was awarded an honorary PhD by the University of Umea in Sweden in 1985.

Okładka tylna:
Professor Kuenne is a leading authority in the field of economic theory, having made significant contributi ons to the fields of general equilibrium theory, industrial organization and regional science.
This volume focuses on the development and exposition of a new theory of oligopoly which is asserted to have certain advantages over game theoretic approaches. It is designed to be opertional, to be capable of fitting within general equilibrium frameworks, to permit multiobjective optimization by firms, and to be soluble by nonlinear programming techniques.
Most importantly, Professor Kuenne develops themes concerning the need to incorporate within oligopoly a blending of the cooperative and competitive that typifies the price strategies of oligopolists within most industries with small numbers of competitors. Unlike game theory, this approach permits analysis of the peculiar socioeconomic power structure that develops within oligopolies and constrains members′ decision–making freedom. This power structure can be derived exogenously or endogenously in the modelling. The theory is developed fully with extensive empirical application, particularly to decision making within the OPEC petroleum cartel in the 1970s.