Free Will and Moral Responsibility

The essays in this volume explore various issues pertaining to human agency, such as the relationship between free will and causal determinism, and the nature and conditions of moral responsibility. The authors build on and extend some of the very best work on this set of topics. The debates are lively and vigorous, and connections are forged between abstract philosophical theorizing and applied work in neuroscience and even criminal law. This volume should be of interest to philosophers and theorists interested in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethics, and the law.

1. Can We Ever Be Really, Truly, Ultimately, Free?: Mark Bernstein (Purdue University).

2. On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility: Randolph Clark (University of Georgia).

3. Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom: E. J. Coffman (University of Notre Dame) and Ted A. Warfield (University of Notre Dame).

4. Alienation, Autonomy, and the Self: Laura Waddell Ekstrom (College of William and Mary).

5. Neurobiology, Neuroimaging, and Free Will: Walter Glannon (University of Calgary).

6. Frankfurt–Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question: Steward Goetz (Ursinus College).

7. Freedom, Obligation, and Responsibility: Prospects for a Unifying Theory: Ishtiyaque Haji (University of Calgary).

8. Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives: David P. Hunt (Whittier College).

9. Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will: Alfred R. Mele (Florida State University).

10. Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet: Michael McKenna (Ithaca College).

11. Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism: Dana K. Nelkin (University of California, San Diego).

12. Freedom with a Human Face: Timothy O′Connor (Indiana University).

13. Defending Hard Incompatibilism: Derk Pereboom (University of Vermont).

14. Free Will and Respect for Persons: Saul Smilansky (University of Haifa).

15. PAPistry: Another Defense: Daniel Speak (Azusa Pacific University).

16. The Trouble with Tracing: Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco).

17. Blameworthiness, Non–robust Alternatives, and the Principle of Alternative Expectations: David Widerker (Bar Ilan University).

18. More on "Ought" Implies "Can" and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Gideon Yaffe (University of Southern California).

John Martin Fischer earned his B.A. and M.A. in philosophy from Stanford University in 1975, and his Ph.D. in philosophy from Cornell University in 1982. He has written on such topics as free will, causal determinism, theological determinism, moral responsibility, abortion, death, immortality, and the meaning of life. He is the author of The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay of Control (Blackwell, 1994); and (with Mark Ravizza, S.J.) Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (1998). A selection of his papers will be published in My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (forthcoming 2005).