Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of Mind, Volume 13 of Philosophical Issues, includes papers by leading philosophers that explore topics such as experience and its representational and qualitative content; subjectivity; causal relevance; a new a priorist argument against materialism; phenomenal color; and other subjects across the spectrum of philosophy of mind.

1. Who′s Afraid of Disjunctive Properties?: Louise Antony (Ohio State University).

2. A Trilemma for Redeployment: Akeel Bilgrami (Columbia University).

3. The Normativity of Content: Paul A. Boghossian (New York University).

4. The Nature of Narrow Content: David J. Chalmers (University of Arizona).

5. Experience as Representation: Fred Dretske (Duke University).

6. Thoughts and Norms: Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).

7. Representation and Narrow Belief: Frank Jackson (Australian National University).

8. Qualia, Properties, Modality: Brian Loar (Rutgers University).

9. Vs. a New A Priorist Argument for Dualism: William G. Lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).

10. What Constitutes the Mind–Body Problem?: Colin McGinn (Rutgers University).

11. A Naturalist–Phnomenal Realist Response to Block′s Harder Problem: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University).

12. Could There Be A Science of Consciousness?: David Papineau (University of London).

13. Looks as Powers: Philip Pettit (Princeton University).

14. Content, Character and Color: Sydney Shoemaker (Cornell University).

15. What Is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?: Galen Strawson (University of Reading).

16. Causal Relevance: Stephen Yablo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)