Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: Volume 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Essays and Exegesis §§185–242

This is an extensively revised second edition of Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, the second volume of Baker and Hacker′s renowned analytical commentary on Wittgenstein′s Philosophical Investigations . Comprising both detailed exegesis and interpretative essays, this edition includes comprehensively revised coverage of some of the most important and widely discussed passages in Wittgenstein′s entire writings, namely his intricate and controversial remarks on following rules (§§189–242). The new edition draws on the full resources of the search engine of the electronic publication of the Nachlass and takes into account the extensive debates on the themes associated with these sections of Wittgenstein′s masterwork over the last quarter of a century. All the essays have been revised and one new essay on communitarian and individualist conceptions of rule–following has been added to the previous six. These deal with the relationship between the alternative continuations of the early draft of the Investigations ; with Wittgenstein′s conception of grammar and rules of grammar; with the relation between a rule and what accords with it; with the characterization of rule–following as mastery of a technique manifest in practice; with the notion of a form of life and agreements in definitions and judgements. The major essay ′Grammar and necessity′ has been greatly extended. It provides an overview of Wittgenstein′s revolutionary and little understood analysis of the propositions of logic, mathematics and metaphysics. Insightful and thought–provoking, the second edition of Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity constitutes a key contribution to the ongoing analysis of one of the most influential philosophical works of the 20th century.

About the Authors ix Acknowledgements x Introduction to Volume 2 xii Abbreviations xvi ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY 1 I Two fruits upon one tree 3 1. The continuation of the Early Draft into philosophy of mathematics 3 2. Hidden isomorphism 7 3. A common methodology 12 4. The flatness of philosophical grammar 19 FOLLOWING A RULE §§185–242 23 Introduction to the exegesis 25 II Rules and grammar 41 1. The Tractatus and rules of logical syntax 41 2. From logical syntax to philosophical grammar 43 3. Rules and rule–formulations 46 4. Philosophy and grammar 55 5. The scope of grammar 59 6. Some morals 65 Exegesis §§185–8 68 III Accord with a rule 81 1. Initial compass bearings 81 2. Accord and the harmony between language and reality 83 3. Rules of inference and logical machinery 88 4. Formulations and explanations of rules by examples 90 5. Interpretations, fitting and grammar 93 6. Further misunderstandings 95 Exegesis §§189–202 98 IV Following rules, mastery of techniques, and practices 135 1. Following a rule 135 2. Practices and techniques 140 3. Doing the right thing and doing the same thing 145 4. Privacy and the community view 149 5. On not digging below bedrock 156 V Private linguists and ‘private linguists’ – Robinson Crusoe sails again 157 1. Is a language necessarily shared with a community of speakers? 157 2. Innate knowledge of a language 158 3. Robinson Crusoe sails again 160 4. Solitary cavemen and monologuists 163 5. Private languages and ‘private languages’ 165 6. Overview 166 Exegesis §§203–37 169 VI Agreement in definitions, judgements and forms of life 211 1. The scaffolding of facts 211 2. The role of our nature 215 3. Forms of life 218 4. Agreement: consensus of human beings and their actions 223 Exegesis §§238–42 231 VII Grammar and necessity 241 1. Setting the stage 241 2. Leitmotifs 245 3. External guidelines 258 4. Necessary propositions and norms of representation 262 5. Concerning the truth and falsehood of necessary propositions 270 6. What necessary truths are about 280 7. Illusions of correspondence: ideal objects, kinds of reality and ultra–physics 283 8. The psychology and epistemology of the a priori 289 (i) Knowledge 289 (ii) Belief 291 (iii) Certainty 294 (iv) Surprise 298 (v) Discoveries and conjectures 300 (vi) Compulsion 305 9. Propositions of logic and laws of thought 308 10. Alternative forms of representation 320 11. The arbitrariness of grammar 332 12. A kinship to the non–arbitrary 338 13. Proof in mathematics 345 14. Conventionalism 356 Index 371

G. P. Baker was a Fellow of St John′s College, Oxford from 1967 until his death in 2002. P. M. S. Hacker is an Emeritus Research Fellow at St John’s College, Oxford, and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kent at Canterbury.