This Is Ethics: An Introduction

What makes you happy? Should you always do what is best for you, or what is best for everyone? What is the meaning of life—and how are we supposed to think about it? Should sacrifices be made to help future generations? This is Ethics presents an accessible and engaging introduction to a variety of issues relating to contemporary moral philosophy. It reveals the intimate connection between timeless philosophical problems about right and wrong and offers timely and thought–provoking insights on everyday practical concerns. Initial chapters focus on how philosophy can help us to think more clearly about how we can live happy and meaningful lives. Subsequent chapters address general ethical theories about what is right and wrong, followed by metaethical questions such as whether morality is relative and how we are motivated to do the right thing. A final series of chapters discuss moral responsibility, population growth, and climate change. Lively and engaging, This is Ethics provides a solid foundation for making informed ethical decisions in today’s increasingly complex world.

Preface xv Acknowledgments xix Part One What’s in Our Interests? 1 1 Pleasure 3 Three Questions about Pleasure 4 What Is Pleasure? 6 The sensation view 7 The attitude view 7 The desire view 8 Physiology of pleasure∗ 10 Value of Pleasure 11 Hedonism 12 Argument in favor of hedonism 1: Discernible differences 13 Argument in favor of hedonism 2: Motivation 13 Higher pleasures 13 Pluralism about prudential value 15 Nozick’s experience machine argument 15 Two responses to Nozick 16 Pessimism about the value of pleasure∗ 17 Summary and Questions 19 Annotated Bibliography 20 Online Resources 22 2 Happiness, Well–being, and the Meaning of Life 25 Hedonism, Again 27 Objection 1: Trivial pleasures 28 Objection 2: The role of happiness in deliberation 28 Satisfaction Theories 29 Desire satisfaction theories of well–being 29 Objections to desire satisfaction theories 30 Objection 1: Which desires count? 30 Objection 2: Expensive tastes 31 Life satisfaction theories of happiness 32 An objection to life satisfaction theories 33 Objective List Theories 34 Objections to the objective list theories 35 The Capability Approach∗ 37 Happiness and the Meaning of Life 39 Emotional state theory of happiness∗ 40 The question of the meaning of life 41 Susan Wolf ’s fitting fulfillment theory 42 Summary and Questions 43 Annotated Bibliography 44 Online Resources 47 Part Two Normative Ethics 51 3 Egoism and Altruism 53 Different Forms of Egoism and Altruism 55 Feldman’s objection to ethical egoism 56 Two Arguments for Ethical Egoism 57 The “ought implies can” argument 58 The practical reasons argument 58 Two Objections to Psychological Egoism 59 The everyday objection 59 The evolutionary objection 60 Moore’s Argument against Ethical Egoism∗ 62 Problems of Moore’s argument∗ 63 Gauthier’s Contractarianism 64 The paradox of social cooperation 65 Contractarianism as a solution 67 The compliance problem 68 Reason one: Risk of exclusion 69 Reason two: Risk of revealing your true motives 69 Summary 69 Problems with Gauthier’s Theory 70 Objection 1: Scope of moral concern 70 Objection 2: Deception 70 Objection 3: Acting for right reasons 71 Summary and Questions 71 Annotated Bibliography 73 Online Resources 75 4 Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 79 Consequentialism 80 Utilitarianism 82 Deliberation procedure vs. criterion of rightness 83 Direct vs. indirect forms of consequentialism 83 Utilitarianism vs. richer conceptions of value 84 Actual vs. expected value 85 Maximizing vs. satisficing 86 Mill’s Argument for Utilitarianism 86 The problems with Mill’s argument 88 Saving Mill’s argument 89 Kantian Ethics 90 The good will 90 The universalization test 92 Duties, right and wrong 94 Why do the right thing? 95 Reason 1: Exceptions 95 Reason 2: Freedom 96 Counterexamples and Convergence 97 Counterexamples to utilitarianism 98 Counterexamples to the Categorical Imperative 99 Utilitarian and consequentialist responses to the counterexamples∗ 100 Kantian responses to the counterexamples∗ 102 Convergence∗ 104 Summary and Questions 105 Annotated Bibliography 106 Online Resources 109 5 Intuitionism, Particularism, and Virtue Ethics 113 Ross’s Objection to Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics 113 Intuitionism in Normative Ethics 115 Prima facie duties 115 How do you know? 117 Prima facie duties and actual duties 118 Particularism 120 Prima facie duties and holism 120 Holism and particularism∗ 121 Knowing what is right∗ 123 Virtue Ethics 124 Flourishing 125 Virtue acquisition 127 Acting virtuously 128 Right and wrong acts 129 Two Objections to Virtue Ethics 130 Circularity 130 Improving yourself 131 Virtue ethics and moral sensibility 131 Summary and Questions 133 Annotated Bibliography 134 Online Resources 136 Part Three Metaethics 139 6 Subjectivism, Relativism, and Divine Commands 141 Subjectivism 143 Advantages of subjectivism 144 Objections to subjectivism 144 Objection 1: Experience 145 Objection 2: Infallibility 145 Objection 3: Disagreement 145 Relativism 146 Advantages of relativism 148 Problems of relativism 149 Problem 1: Disagreement 149 Problem 2: Moral fallibility 150 Problem 3: Tolerance 150 Problem 4: Multiculturalism 151 Divine Command Theory 151 Divine command theory and moral words 151 Divine command theory and moral properties 153 Advantages of divine command theory 154 The Euthyphro Dilemma∗ 155 What is right explains what God commands∗ 156 God’s commands explain what is right∗ 156 Problem 1: God’s goodness 157 Problem 2: Anything could be wrong 157 Problem 3: The reasons for God’s commands 158 Summary and Questions 158 Annotated Bibliography 159 Online Resources 163 7 Naturalism and the Open Question Argument 167 Moral Realism 167 Naturalism vs. non–naturalism 168 Pros and cons of non–naturalism 169 The Open Question Argument 171 Stage 1: Words and properties 172 Stage 2: Moral words and moral properties 173 Stage 3: The open question test 173 Stage 4: Moral words and open questions 174 Stage 5: Putting the argument together 175 Responses to the Open Question Argument 176 Response 1: Begging the question 176 Response 2: Making know–how explicit 177 Response 3: The sense/reference distinction 179 Intuitionism in Metaethics∗ 181 The problem of knowledge∗ 181 Foundationalism to the rescue∗ 183 Misconceptions and objections∗ 184 Misconception 1: The role of experience and emotions 184 Misconception 2: What seems self–evident to you 184 Objection 1: People who understand but don’t agree 185 Objection 2: Dogmatism 186 Summary and Questions 186 Annotated Bibliography 187 Online Resources 190 8 Moral Motivation and Expressivism 195 The Argument from Motivation 196 The Humean Theory of Motivation 197 Directions of fit 197 The role of beliefs and desires 198 Moral Judgment Internalism 199 Very Strong Internalism 200 Weakness of will 201 Strong Internalism 201 Counterexamples to Strong Internalism 202 Amoralists 202 Bad people 203 A case of depression 204 Expressivism 205 The core claims of expressivism 206 Claim 1: Moral judgments 207 Claim 2: Moral language 208 Claim 3: Moral properties 210 Responses to two common objections 211 Objection 1: Truths and facts 211 Objection 2: Mere attitudes 211 The Frege–Geach Problem 212 Embedded claims 212 Valid inferences∗ 213 The negation problem∗ 214 Summary and Questions 215 Annotated Bibliography 217 Online Resources 220 Part Four Ethical Questions 223 9 Moral Responsibility 225 What Is Moral Responsibility? 225 Causal responsibility and attributability 227 The agency condition 227 Freedom and real selves 229 The Freedom Principle: A Threat for Moral Responsibility 230 The consequence argument 230 The problem of luck 231 Galen Strawson’s argument against moral responsibility 232 The Frankfurt Cases 234 Objections and responses∗ 235 Objection 1: Flicker of freedom 235 Objection 2: A dilemma 235 Response 1: Mele and Robb 236 Response 2: Dennett 236 The Deep Attributability Principle 237 Frankfurt’s higher–order desire theory 238 The Real Self 239 Watson’s theory of the real self 240 The time–slice problem 241 Responsiveness to reasons 242 Summary and Questions 243 Annotated Bibliography 244 Online Resources 247 10 Population Growth and Climate Change 249 The Non–Identity Effect 251 The Repugnant Conclusion 253 The average utility principle 256 Critical–level utilitarianism∗ 257 Variable value view and intuitions∗ 259 Climate Change and Personal Obligations 260 Carbon off setting 261 Climate Change and Governments 262 The discount rate∗ 264 The social action problem 266 Climate Change and Uncertainty 267 Maximizing expected value∗ 268 Summary and Questions 269 Annotated Bibliography 271 Online Resources 272 Glossary of Terms 275 Index 293

Jussi Suikkanen is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham, UK. He has contributed numerous articles on metaethics and normative ethics in journals such as The Philosophical Quarterly , Oxford Studies in Metaethics , and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly .