The Powers of the Union

The Powers of the Union develops and tests a new theory of centralization and bureaucratization in the European Union. Using original data spanning five decades and a multi-method approach, Franchino argues that most EU laws rely extensively on national administrations for policy implementation and provide for ample national discretionary authority, while limiting tightly the involvement of the European Commission. However, when Council ministers do not share the same policy objectives, some have the incentive to limit national executive discretion and to rely more on the Commission. Majority voting facilitates this outcome, but the limited policy expertise of supranational bureaucrats and their biased views impede extensive supranational delegation. Finally, the European Parliament systematically attempts to limit national discretion, especially when its views differ from ministerial opinions, and tries to increase the Commissions policy autonomy. The book contributes towards understanding political-bureaucratic relations and evaluates the implications for EU democracy and subsidiarity.

Spis treści:
1. Introduction
2. A formal model of delegation in the European Union
3. Data and longitudinal analysis
4. Decision rules, preferences and policy complexity
5. Delegation in the European Union, quantitative analysis
6. Delegation in the European Union, case studies
7. The delegation preferences of the European Parliament
8. Conclusion.