Auction Theory

Vijay Krishna’s 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.

Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctionsNew chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

I Single Object Auctions Private Value Auctions The Revenue Equivalence Principle Qualifications and Extensions Mechanism Design Auctions with Interdependent Values The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle Asymmetries and Other Complications Efficiency and the English Auction Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values Bidding Rings

II Multiple Object Auctions An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values Some Revenue Considerations Sequential Sales Nonidentical Objects Packages and Positions Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values

III Appendices Continuous Distributions Stochastic Orders Order Statistics Affiliated Random Variables Some Linear Algebra